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THE LONG ARM OF U.S. LAW: THE HELMS-BURTON

ACT

I. INTRODUCTION

With the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act),' extraterritorial legislation seems to be in vogue. 2 Passed during the politically
charged atmosphere of the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign, the
Act uses two principal methods to counter the recent effort by Cuban President Fidel Castro to bolster Cuba's faltering economy by
luring foreign investors to the island. 3 First, the Act allows U.S.
nationals to sue foreign individuals or corporations for using property that U.S. nationals once owned, but that the Cuban government has since expropriated. 4 Second, the Act bars U.S. entry to
individuals who are using such expropriated property individually
5
or through their companies.
The Helms-Burton Act purports to advance liberty and democracy in Cuba by hastening the end of the Castro regime. It
thus appears to be little more than an extension of the decades-old
U.S. embargo aimed at bringing down the Castro government. Although this aim is not new-the United States has been trying to
topple the Cuban dictator for over thirty-five years 6-the means

1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (HelmsBurton), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996). The Act is generally referred to as the HelmsBurton Act for its two principal sponsors, North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms and Indiana Congressman Dan Burton.
2. Shortly after the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, Congress passed another extraterritorial measure, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110
Stat. 1541.
3. For a description of the impetus leading to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act,
see Steven Erlanger, Tough Talk Aside, Helms and His Senate Committee Barely Alter
Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at A8; see also LEY No. 77: LA LEY DE LA
INVERSION [ACT No. 77: FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT], reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 331 (1996)
(discussing the Cuban foreign investment strategy).
4. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081-6085.
5. See id. § 6091.
6. The United States has made several attempts to defeat Castro, including the
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currently chosen depart from previous tactics. Historically, the
United States has placed restrictions on the activities of U.S. citizens and companies in Cuba, including commercial restrictions on
U.S. companies operating in Cuba.
The irony of this latest U.S. initiative is that it runs counter to
two significant trends. First, as a result of the end of the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union, countries feel
less compelled to follow the U.S. lead in many ventures from political to military. 7 Second, the international trade system has become increasingly interdependent. 8 The former suggests that the
United States should act in a way that induces foreign countries to
follow its lead in international affairs. The latter counsels against
taking bold unilateral actions in foreign and trade policy matters at
a time when nations are moving toward more interdependent
trade arrangements and relying on bilateral and multilateral trade
cooperation rather than unilateral mechanisms such as quotas and
tariffs.
At first glance, the Helms-Burton Act is nothing more than a
U.S. foreign policy limited to Cuba. Upon deeper inspection,
however, the Act affects various countries, 9 business interests, 10 international trade agreements, 1" and ultimately, international law
itself. 12 Indeed, countries around the world-many of which are
failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, bungled assassination attempts, and even a plot to

make Castro's infamous beard fall out. See LOCH K.
POWER 67 (1989).

JOHNSON,

AMERICA'S SECRET

7. See generally Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Strategic Moment, WASH. Q., Winter 1996,

at 5.
8. See generally Jeffrey E. Garten, Is America Abandoning Multilateral Trade?,

FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 50. Garten states that "expanded trade is now more
critical to America's future than at any other time in this century." Id. at 51-52.
9. The law has primarily affected countries that do substantial business in Cuba, including Canada, Mexico, and the countries of the European Union. See Dick Kirschten,
The Big Chill, NAT'L J., June 29, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 10107373.
10. Many U.S. and international businesses are concerned about the Helms-Burton
Act's chilling effect on foreign investment and the potential effects of retaliatory efforts
by countries adversely affected by the Act will have on the global trading system. See discussion infra Part V.
11. The Canadian and Mexican governments have charged that the Helms-Burton
Act conflicts with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See discussion
infra Part IV.B.1. The Canadian and Mexican governments, along with the European
Union, have determined that the Act violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
12. See Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
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U.S. allies-denounce the Helms-Burton Act as an extraterritorial
extension of U.S. law and have vowed to fight its implementation. 13 Some of these countries, including those which comprise
the European Union, as well as Canada and Mexico, have enacted
retaliatory or blocking legislation and have charged that the Act
violates international trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 14 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which created the World
15
Trade Organization (WTO).
This Comment argues that, although the United States uses
international legal principles to support its efforts against Cuba,
the Helms-Burton Act is less consistent with international law and
more a codification of U.S. foreign policy. This distinction is important because the former operates within a delicate regime that
depends largely on the volition of its followers, while the latter is a
function of U.S. hegemony and the resources-political, economic,
and military-that the United States can bring to bear to effectuate its policies. But, when U.S. power is brought to bear to enforce
a law whose legality among the international community is as least
suspect, if not firmly rejected, the legitimacy of both U.S. power
and international law are threatened.
Part II of this Comment provides a background on the conflict
between Cuba and the United States to place the Helms-Burton
Act in proper context. Part III describes and analyzes the major
on W. Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,

104th Cong. 16 (1995) (statement of the Hon. Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs) [hereinafter Tarnoff Statement].

13. See Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Troubleshooter Discovers Big Trouble from Allies
on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at Al; see also John Goshko, 3 Allies Join Call
Against Cuba Embargo, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1996, at A19. In 1996, the United Nations

overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling for an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba.
See Goshko, supra. The United Nations has passed such a resolution in each of the past

five years, but the most recent resolution specifically cited the Helms-Burton Act as violating the sovereignty of other states and the principles of free trade and navigation. See
id.
14. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
15. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS

OF THE URUGUAY

ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (The Final or "Uruguay" round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the agreement that produced the World
Trade Organization (WTO)).
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provisions of the Act and their effects, which include diplomatic
protests and condemnations by various countries and commercial
entities, blocking or retaliatory legislation primarily by the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, and charges that the Act violates NAFTA and GATT. Part IV looks at the broader, potential
long-term consequences of extraterritorial legislation that has experienced a revival in the 104th Congress.
This Comment concludes that the Helms-Burton Act should
be amended to exclude the provisionsthat operate extraterritorially in order to preserve: (1) the international trade agreements to
which the United States is a party, (2) international law, (3) the integrity of U.S. foreign policy, and (4) the relationships with foreign
nations that are predisposed to support U.S. policy. It is clearly in
the best interests of the United States to amend the Act in order to
maintain foreign policy consistent with, at the very least, the international legal principles that it recognizes and to show respect for
the international agreements and bilateral relationships from
which it greatly benefits. Accordingly, Part V provides alternatives that are less offensive, more effective, and more respectful
toward other countries' sovereignty and international law.
II.BACKGROUND

A. The Initiationof the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba
In the early 1960s, after Fidel Castro wrested control of Cuba
from President Fulgencio Batista, the Cuban government began to
nationalize properties-many of which were owned by foreign nationals or persons who subsequently fled from Cuba to the United
States. 16 The restructuring of the Cuban economy led to the
adoption of the Fundamental Law of the Republic, 17 which provided the legal basis for Cuba's confiscatory decrees.' 8 In response

16. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of
the U.S. Nationals' ExpropriationsClaims Against Cubta, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659,
661 (1996).
17. Ley Fundamental de la Republica, No. 5-123, GACETA OFICIAL,'7 Feb. 1959
(Cuba).
18. See MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS 71 (1976) (citing
Ley Fundamental de la Republica, No. 5-123, GACETA OFICIAL, 7 Feb., 1959 (Cuba)).
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to the confiscations, the U.S. Congress passed the 1961 Foreign
Assistance Act, 19 which authorized the President to impose an
economic embargo against Cuba. 20 The following year, Congress
broadened the embargo through the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,21 which restricted Cuba's assets in the United States and
prohibited U.S. citizens or corporations from conducting any
commercial transactions with Cuba. 22 Further, Congress identified
and validated property claims against Cuba. In 1964, Congress
amended the 1949 International Claims Settlement Act 23 to enable
U.S. nationals to file claims against the Cuban government. 24 To
date, Cuba has compensated none of these claims. 25
B. Subsequent U.S. Policy and Its Effect on PresidentialPolitics
In the early 1960s, the United States gave Cuban nationals a
refugee status unlike that offered to other foreign nationals. 26
Until 1994, Cubans who reached the United States were given immediate asylum. 27 This rule provided the impetus for hundreds of

thousands of Cubans to flee to the United States, seeking refuge
predominantly in southern Florida. 28 The demographic change
19. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,22 U.S.C. § 2371(a)(1) (1994).
20. See id. § 2370(a)(1). Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibited giving any assistance to the Cuban government. See Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 424, 444-45. Congress intended a total prohibition on trade between the United States and Cuba.
21. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1994).
22. See id. The Regulations also restrict cash remittances to Cuba. See id.
23. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 12 (codified in 22 U.S.C. §§
1621-27 (1994)).
24. See Cuban Claims Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). The Act defines the term
"national" as "a natural person who is a citizen of the United States." Id. § 1643a(l)(A).
25. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16, at 665.
26. See Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994)).
27. See U.S. Alters Policy, Will Hold Cubans, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 19, 1994, at
Al. The Cuban Adjustment Act gave Cubans the privilege of being released into the custody of relatives or other sponsors instead of being repatriated. See id.; see also Art Pine,
Cuba Refugees in U.S. Hold Special Immigration Status, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at
A14.
28. Between 1959 and 1980, approximately 800,000 Cubans settled in the United
States, and since then, approximately 200,000 Cubans have arrived. See Legal and Practical Implications of Title III of the Helms-Burton Law Before the Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 62
(1996) (prepared statement of Robert L. Muse, Attorney) [hereinafter Muse Statement].
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over the past thirty-five year period has greatly altered the dynamic of presidential politics. Florida now possesses the fourth
largest number of votes in the electoral college, and thus it is a
29
perennial battleground for candidates seeking the presidency.
The battle for the Cuban-American vote has evolved since the
organization of this distinct and sizable constituency in the early
1980s with the formation of the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF). The CANF is now a powerful lobby that includes
a political action committee which doles out hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions. 30 The importance of
the Cuban-American vote in U.S. presidential elections, combined
with the disappearance of subsidies once provided by the Soviet
Union, has made tightening the screws on the U.S. embargo
against Cuba a rarity-a -foreign policy that reaps domestic rewards.
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA) 31 is a case in
point. In 1992, Congressman (now Senator) Robert Torricelli, a
New Jersey Democrat, introduced the CDA, the precursor to the
Helms-Burton Act. 32 The CDA aims to hasten the fall of the Castro regime in order to pave the way for a democratically-elected
government that respects human rights and that the Cuban military does not dominate. 33 To further this goal, the CDA authorizes the President to impose sanctions on any country that provides
assistance to Cuba. 34 Possible sanctions include ineligibility for

29. See Booth Gunther, Campaigns Focus on Florida Factor, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 3,
1996, availablein 1996 WL 13982358.
30. See Christopher Marquis & Josh Goldstein, Cuban Exile Lobby is the Most CostEffective, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 1997, at 1A; see also Carla Anne Robbins, Dateline
Washington: Cuban-American Clout, FOREIGN POL., Fall 1992, at 162, 170-73.

31. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1996). The CDA
strengthened the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba by, among other things, prohibiting foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from conducting business in Cuba. See id. §
6005(b)(1).
32. See Robbins, supra note 30, at 166. Torricelli's interest in Cuba policy is a vested
one. In recent years, New Jersey has developed a constituency of 85,000 CubanAmericans, which became a key base of support for Torricelli's recent successful campaign for the U.S. Senate. See id. In addition, Torricelli is the second top recipient of
funds from CANF leaders and their Free Cuba political action committee. See Marquis &
Goldstein, supra note 30.
33. See 22 U.S.C. § 6007.

34. See id. § 6003(b)(1).
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U.S. assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or ineligibility for forgiveness or reduction of debts owed to the United
States. 35 The CDA also prohibits vessels that enter a Cuban port
from loading or unloading any freight in U.S. ports for 180 days
following departure from the Cuban port. 36 The most controversial of the CDA's provisions prohibits foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies from doing business with Cuba. 37 This provision
sparked concern among many U.S. allies because of its extraterri38
torial nature.
When first presented with legislation that included such a
provision, President George Bush indicated that he could not sign
it because it would apply U.S. law extraterritorially and "'could
force foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to choose between violating
U.S. laws or host country laws.' 39 Two years later, however,
presidential candidate Bill Clinton announced that he liked the
bill.4 0 Weighing the consequences of losing Florida's support in
the 1992 presidential contest, Bush signed the bill, with the extraterritorial provisions intact.4 1
A similar calculus operated in President Clinton's signing of
the Helms-Burton Act. The bill reached the President's desk
shortly after Cuba shot down two small aircrafts operated by a
Cuban exile group. 42 Thus, the political ramifications that signing
the bill would have on the upcoming presidential election strongly
influenced Clinton's decision to sign the bill.4 3 Nonetheless, the
Clinton administration stressed explicit concerns with regard to
the Helms-Burton Act's effects on U.S. trading partners, interna-

35. See id. § 6003(b)(1)(A)-(B).

36. See id. § 6005(b)(1).
37. See id. § 6005.
38. See Bush's Signing of Cuba Embargo Law May Trigger GATT Complaint, EC
Warns, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Oct. 28, 1992).
39. Bush Uses Veto to Block Bill Banning Cuban Trade, CALGARY HERALD, Nov.
17, 1990, at A8.

40. See Robbins, supra note 30, at 167.
41. See id.

42. See Myers, supra note 13.
43. See id.; see also Erlanger, supra note 3 (noting that Clinton's signing of the bill
was a reflection of his eagerness to turn his position 180 degrees in the interest of reelection and Florida's electoral votes).
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tional trade agreements, and other international commitments. 44
Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the Helms-Burton Act potentially conflicts with NIAFTA, GATT, the Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, and arms control cooperation with and
support for democracy in Russia. 45 In addition, Tarnoff stressed
the bill's possible conflict with U.S. obligations under the charters
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and
most importantly, with "principles of international law that have
served U.S. business and the U.S. government well."' 46 Despite
these reservations-and the fact that Congress passed a final bill
that included all of the provisions with which the Clinton admini47
stration expressed concern-Clinton ultimately signed the bill.
C. The Cuban ForeignInvestment Strategy
The Helms-Burton Act was a direct response to a Cuban government policy recently created to respond to the precipitous decline in the Cuban economy that began in the early 1990s after the
Soviet Union withdrew its substantial subsidies to Cuba.48 In order to bolster its economy, Cuba set out to attract foreign investment by easing the restrictions forbidding foreign ownership of
Cuban land. 49 The Castro government thus made a conscious decision to move from a strict socialist economic model to a hybrid
socialist economic model that resembles the largely successful
economic transitions in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
Vietnam. 50 The Helms-Burton Act is clearly a response to Castro's policy because the Act specifically intends to chill foreign investors from providing Cuba with the cash that it desperately
44. See Tarnoff Statement, supra note 12; see also Interview with Richard A. Nuccio,
Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Cuba, in U.S.-CUBA

POL'Y. REP., Sept. 20, 1995, at 1.
45. See Tarnoff Statement, supra note 12.
46. Id.

47. See Clinton Signs Bill on Cuba Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A4; see
also Stephen A. Lisio, Helms-Burton and the Point of Diminishing Returns, 72 INT'L AFF.
691 (1996).

48. See You Can't Get Therefrom Here, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at S3.
49. See Jorge A. Vargas, Introductory Note, Cuba: Foreign Investment Act of 1995,
35 I.L.M. 331 (1996).

50. See id. at 332.
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needs to make the type of transition that the PRC and Vietnam
51
used to prevent the collapse of their economies.
III. THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
The Helms-Burton Act is comprised of four titles. 52 The first
two titles consist primarily of a restatement of the U.S. embargo
against Cuba and the conditions and incentives for its termination. 53 The latter two titles are largely what is new with Cuba policy, with Title III as the primary focus of the extraterritoriality
charges that have surrounded the Act.54
A. Provisions of the Helms-Burton Act
1. Titles I and II: "Strengthening International Sanctions Against
the Castro Goverment" and "Assistance to a Free and
Independent Cuba"
Title I of the Helms-Burton Act addresses the U.S. desire to
strengthen its economic embargo against Cuba. 55 Title II sets out
the requirements for lifting the economic sanctions and provides a
list of inducements to a transition of government. 56 The Act directs the Secretary of State to instruct the diplomatic corps to
communicate the reasons for the U.S. embargo and to urge foreign
governments to cooperate with U.S. efforts to enforce the embargo. 57 Further, the Act underscores the legislation already in
force to sanction Cuba, 58 reiterates U.S. opposition to Cuban
51. The Helms-Burton Act identifies the Cuban foreign investment strategy as frustrating the effects of the U.S. embargo because foreign investment "provides badly
needed financial benefit" and thus "undermines the foreign policy of the United States."
22 U.S.C. § 6081(6) (1996).
52. During the lengthy debate over the Helms-Burton Act, the four major sections of
the bill came to be referred to as "titles," which is the way each section was labeled before passage and codification in the United States Code. In common parlance, the sections
that the United States Code refers to as "subchapters" continue to be referred to as
"titles."
53. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021,6061.
54. See id. §§ 6081-6091.
55. See id. § 6032.
56. See id. § 6061.
57. See id. § 6032(b).
58. This legislation includes the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 60016010, the Trading with the Enemy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6004, and the Foreign Assistance Act
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membership in international financial institutions (IFIs), 59 and announces the reduction of financial support to IFIs that assist Cuba
financially. 60 The Act also expresses Congress' insistence that the
United States oppose any change in the Cuban government's current suspension from participation in the Organization of Ameri61
can States (OAS).
In contrast to most other U.S. foreign policy legislation, the
Helms-Burton Act sets out a remarkably detailed prescription as
to how the United States expects to see Cuba develop. Many of its
punitive characteristics, such as the economic sanctions, may end
only when the President determines that Cuba has established a
"democratically elected government" as defined in 22 U.S.C. §
6066.62 In determining whether Cuba has established such a govof 1961,22 U.S.C. § 2494-1. The Helms-Burton Act specifically mentions the Cuban Assets Control Regulations set forth in 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1994). See Helms-Burton Act, 22
U.S.C. § 6032(c).
59. See 22 U.S.C. § 6034(a).
60. See id. § 6034(b). Specifically, these IFIs include the International Monetary
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the Inter-American Development Bank. See id. §
6034(b)(2)(c).
61. See id. § 6035. This provision reinforces Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg.
1085 (1962). The Proclamation reiterates the resolutions passed at the Eighth Meeting of
the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, declaring that "the present
Government of Cuba ... is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the interAmerican system" and calling for OAS member states to "take those steps that they may
consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense." Id. The United
States interpreted these resolutions as authorizing under international law the imposition
of the U.S. embargo and superseding the prohibition against economic sanctions contained in the OAS Charter. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The HelmsBurton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 420 n.8 (1996). Incidentally, at the OAS annual
meeting in June 1996, the General Assembly unanimously, except for the United States,
criticized the Helms-Burton Act as a violation of international law. See NAFTA Roundup: OAS Condemns Helms Burton, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., June 15,
1996, available in 1996 WL 10175489.
62. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6065-6066. The prerequisite to a democratically elected government, according to the Helms-Burton Act, is a "transition government." The Act defines a transition government in Cuba as a government that:
(1) has legalized all political activity;
(2) has released all political prisoners and allowed for investigations of Cuban
prisons by appropriate international human rights organizations;
(3) has dissolved the present Department of State Security in the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
and the Rapid Response Brigades; and
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ernment, the President must consider some very specific factors.
For example, the President must consider whether Cuban-born
persons returning to Cuba have been allowed to regain their Cu63
ban citizenship.
2. Title III: "Protection of Property Rights of United States
Nationals"
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act contains the law's most
controversial provisions. One such provision is 22 U.S.C. § 6082,
which creates a private right of action in U.S. district courts for any

U.S. national who has a claim for property confiscated by Cuba
since January 1, 1959,64 These claims may be made against any
person who "traffics" in or uses such confiscated property. 65 A
(4) has made public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new
government...
(B) with the participation of multiple independent political parties that
have full access to the media on an equal basis...
(5) has ceased any interference with Radio Marti or Television Marti broadcasts;
(6) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable progress in(A) establishing an independent judiciary;
(B) respecting internationally recognized human rights and basic freedoms
as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is
a signatory nation;
(C) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions ...and allowing the establishment of independent social, economic, and political associations;
(7) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro...
Id. § 6065(a).
63. See id. § 6065(b)(2)(B) ("In determining whether a transition government in
Cuba is in power, the President shall take into account the extent to which that government has made public commitments to, and is making demonstrable progress in permitting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to Cuba.
(emphasis added)).
64. See id. § 6082(a). For the purposes of the Act, the term "United States national"
means: "(A) any United States citizen; or (B) any other legal entity which is organized
under the laws of the United States, or of any State, . . . and which has its principal place
of business in the United States." § 6023(15). Therefore, U.S. national includes individuals or entities who are now U.S. citizens, but were not at the time Cuba confiscated
the property. The term "property" means any tangible and intangible property, including
future interests, and includes everything from real estate to intellectual property. Id. §
6023(12)(A). The Helms-Burton Act excludes residential real property unless that property is "occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in
Cuba." ld. § 6023(B)(ii).
65. See id. § 6082. A person "traffics" if that person knowingly and intentionally(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of
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claimant may also seek treble damages, which can amount to three
66
times the property's fair market value.
Although the group of potential plaintiffs under the Act includes U.S. citizens who are exiles from Cuba, significant differences exist in the treatment of those U.S. nationals who have obtained certified claims before the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC) and U.S. nationals who have not. The former
group may bring their actions at any time after August 1, 1996,
while the latter group, which consists largely of persons who were
Cuban exiles at the time of the confiscation but are now U.S. nationals, must wait two years from the date of the Helms-Burton
Act's enactment before filing actions in federal court. 67 This provision does not, however, affect accrual of damages under the Act.
While President Clinton did suspend the right to file suits under
Title III, the suspension does not stay the accrual of damages.
3. Title IV: "Exclusion of Certain Aliens"
Title IV is nearly as controversial as Title III. This provision
seeks to exclude from the United States persons involved in trafficking confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. 68 It casts a wide net because it includes anyone who knowingly and intentionally "causes,
directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by another
person, or otherwise engages in trafficking . . . through another
person. '69 Further, foreign persons who "traffic" can be denied
visas to enter the United States. This includes the spouse, minor

confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of,
manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from trafficking . . .without the
authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.
Id. § 6023(13)(A).
66. See id. § 6082(a)(3)(C)(ii).
67. Prior to the Helms-Burton Act, only persons who were U.S. nationals at the time
of the confiscation by the Cuban government could file claims. See Cuban Claims Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1643 (1996). The Cuban Claims Act limited the FCSC's jurisdiction to claims of

persons who were U.S. nationals at the time of their property loss. See id. § 1643a.
68. See id. § 6091 (a).
69. Id. § 6091(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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child, or agent of an excludable person. 70
B. The Helms-Burton Act and Principlesof InternationalLaw
1. The "Substantial Effect" and "Reasonableness" Doctrines
The drafters of the Helms-Burton Act were clearly aware that
the Act would be criticized for its extraterritorial nature. 71 In anticipation of such criticism, they turned to international law for
justification. 72 According to congressional findings, international
law allows a nation to provide for some extraterritoriality:
"International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory."' 73 The findings reflect section 402 of the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement),
which indicates that some extraterritoriality is permissible: "[A]
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ...conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory. ' 74 Section 403 of the Restatement, however,
adds an important limitation: "Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under [section] 402 is present, a state may not exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.' 75 Therefore, the key inquiries are:
(1) whether the Helms-Burton Act satisfies the substantial effect
doctrine; and (2) whether the U.S. court's exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign corporations "trafficking" in U.S. property is unreasonable pursuant to the limitation set out in Restatement section
403.
The first inquiry is the target of the legislation. The Cuban
government, not the persons over whom jurisdiction is exercised,
caused the "effect" that the Act targets-the effect being the eco70. See id. § 6091 (a)(4).
71. See id. § 6081(9).
72. See id.

73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402(1)(c) (1986) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 403(1) (emphasis added).
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nomic repercussions of the original nationalization of U.S. property. 76 The exercise of jurisdiction over persons found to be
"trafficking" in U.S. property punishes foreign corporations investing in Cuba while legally not touching the Cuban government.
Therefore, the Helms-Burton Act can only affect the Cuban gov77
ernment indirectly by deterring foreign investment in Cuba.
The second inquiry is whether the exercise of jurisdiction under Title III is "reasonable" within the meaning of Restatement
section 403. Because the Helms-Burton Act cannot legally affect
the Cuban government, it is highly questionable whether exercising jurisdiction over foreign corporations trafficking in U.S. property is "reasonable."
Perhaps the best way to construct a definition in this regard
is to determine how "reasonable" the United States would view
similar legislation from another country. In fact, a pair of Canadian legislators, Peter Godfrey and Peter Milliken, introduced
their answer to the Helms-Burton Act in the Canadian House of
Commons. 78 The Godfrey-Milliken Bill would allow descendants
of British loyalists who fled during the American Revolution to
seek compensation from the U.S. government for lost property. 79
U.S. State Department, Spokesman Nicholas Burns remarked
"Should the [Godfrey-Milliken] bill become law, I'm sure we'll
give it the same warm welcome that Canada gave HelmsBurton. ' 80 Incidentally, the American founding fathers promised
to pay restitution for confiscated property, but never have. 81
2. The "Act of State" Doctrine
The drafters of the Helms-Burton Act also anticipated the
"act of state" doctrine as a possible obstacle and proscribed its
application when adjudicating claims brought pursuant to the
76. See Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 431.
77. See Muse Statement, supra note 28.
78. See U.S. Responds in Kind to Canadian Bill Mocking Helms-Burton, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12164183; see also 60 Minutes: 1776 and

All That (CBS Television Broadcast, Oct. 20, 1996) (transcript on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles Internationaland Comparative Law Journal).
79. See U.S. Responds in Kind to Canadian Bill Mocking Helms-Burton, supra note

78.
80. Id.
81.

See 60 Minutes: 1776 and All That, supra note 78.
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Act.82 The act of state doctrine generally precludes U.S. courts
from inquiring into the validity of public acts that a recognized
sovereign power has committed within its own territory. 83 Al85
though neither international law84 nor the U.S. Constitution
mandate the act of state doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked
it in 1964 to prevent the U.S. judiciary from inquiring into the validity of a Cuban government expropriation decree. 86 In response,
Congress enacted the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 87 which
bars the invocation of the doctrine in cases involving foreign expropriation of property where such expropriations were alleged to
88
have occurred in violation of international law.
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino8 9 suggests that circumvention of the act of state doctrine
may be constitutional. 90 Nevertheless, Justice John Marshall
Harlan, writing for eight of the nine Supreme Court Justices, expressed the "strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both
for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the inter-

82. See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(6) (1996) ("No court of the United States shall decline,
based upon the act of state doctrine, to make a determination on the merits in an action
brought under paragraph (1).").
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 444 (1986); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416
(1964) ("Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory." (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897))).
84. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-22 ("No international arbital or judicial decision
discovered suggests that international law prescribes recognition of sovereign acts of foreign governments ...").
85. See id. at 423. In Sabbatino, the Court remarked: "Ifinternational law does not
prescribe the use of the doctrine, neither does it forbid application of the rule even if it is
claimed that the act of state in question violated international law." Id. at 422.
86. See id. at 425. The Court analogized the act of state doctrine to the Erie doctrine,
underscoring federal cdurts' function and lack of competence to interpret state law, and
by analogy, likening that to international law. See id. at 421-22.
87. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994) (amending Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 424, 444-45).
88. See id.
89. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
90. See id. at 423.
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91

national sphere."
Insistence that the federal courts circumvent the act of state
doctrine-ignoring the court's limited function in international.
relations and the judiciary's limited competence to pass judgment
on a foreign sovereign's laws-is misappropriation of the judiciary
to perform what is essentially a legislative and executive function.
Executing a foreign policy via the U.S. courts is both an abuse of
the judicial process and an unwise precedent, especially if Congress expands such a practice into other areas of international affairs.92
3. The Nationality of Claims Principle
Another area in which the Helms-Burton Act is at odds with
existing international legal principles is the change in the definition of who may bring claims before U.S. courts. Over thirty years
ago, the FCSC found: "The principle of international law that eligibility for compensation requires [U.S.] nationality at the time of
loss is so widely understood and universally accepted that citation
93
of authority is scarcely necessary."
The Helms-Burton Act changed this principle by eliminating
the requirement that claimants be U.S. nationals at the time of the
seizure of their property. 94 As a result, the number of potential
suits jumped from thousands under the old definition to hundreds
of thousands under the new definition. 95 The inclusion of claimants who were Cuban nationals at the time of the confiscation of
their property, coupled with the expansive definition of "traffic,"
translates into a veritable deluge of potential suits under the
Helms-Burton Act. The number of potential claimants is, however, simply being used for its deterrent effect on foreign invest-

91. Id.
92. This practice could include further legislation in the same or similar areas, such as
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541.
93. Claim No. IT-10, 252, Dec. No. IT-62 (emphasis added). The FCSC is a U.S.
government agency established to validate the claims of U.S. nationals who have suffered
foreign property losses, often through expropriation. The FCSC is required to employ
international law in reaching its decisions. See Cuban Claims Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643
(1996).
94. See Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4) (1996).
95.

See Muse Statement, supra note 28.

Helms-Burton Act

1997]

725

96

ment in Cuba.
Clearly, by breaking with the established practice of requiring
that claimants be U.S. nationals at the time their property was
confiscated, the United States has done two things. First, it evidently hopes that by greatly increasing the number of potential
claimants, foreign investors will think long and hard before investing in Cuba. Second, it has essentially invited more Cubans to
seek U.S. citizenship in order employ the power of U.S. courts to
recover damages for their expropriated property. Neither case
justifies the perversion of established international legal principles.
4. The "Requirements" Problem
One of the most troubling aspects of the Helms-Burton Act is
the specificity with which it defines a "transition government" and
a "democratically elected government. '97 The strictures upon the
President to make a factual finding are so tight that it appears only
the complete subjugation of the Cuban government will satisfy the
requirements of the Helms-Burton Act. Indeed, this might explain
some of the foreign discontent with the Act; the United States
looks more like a bully asserting its great power prerogatives than
a serious arbiter of democracy in the Western Hemisphere.
On a domestic level, the stringent requirements placed upon
the President rob the administration of the flexibility required to
effectively maneuver within the delicate realm of international diplomacy. Acutely specific foreign policies often breed hostility between the executive and legislative branches because the administration will invariably resent being so completely removed from
the foreign policy process. Furthermore, such inflexible policies
lessen the opportunity for an administration to bring its own creativity to bear on given policy. With regard to the Helms-Burton
Act, President Clinton has chosen to indefinitely suspend the Title
III provision that allows aggrieved parties to file lawsuits. 98 By
signing the bill into law, however,, Clinton has allowed Congress to
limit his opportunities to work with U.S. allies to bring democracy
to Cuba. Traditionally, Presidents have bristled at the idea of
96.
97.
98.
Jan. 6,

See id.
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Holds Up Cuba Suits, PleasingFew, WALL ST. J.,
1997, at Al.
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Congress restricting the executive branch in such a way. 99
IV. The Paradeof Horribles:The European Union, Canada,and
Mexico v. The Helms-Burton Act

A. DiplomaticProtests, Condemnations,and Blocking or
Retaliatory Legislation

1. The European Union

00

The Helms-Burton Act clearly seeks to effect a regime change
in Cuba. 101 Although many countries have no quarrel with that
aim, 102 some countries object to the means chosen to further it. 103
The European Union (EU) has found that the Helms-Burton Act
is extraterritorial and, therefore, violates international law. 104 Jacques Santer, Chairman of the European Commission, recently
99. See Bush Uses Veto to Block Bill Banning Cuban Trade, supra note 39. In 1990,
for example, President Bush refused to sign a bill that included a ban on trade with Cuba
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies because he felt it was impermissibly extraterritorial and would interfere with his ability to carry out foreign policy. See id.
100. The European Union consists of 15 nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF

FACTS 1996 at 842 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1995).
101. See22 U.S.C. § 6022(1), (4).
102. See Malcolm Rifkind, Speech at the National Press Club Luncheon, in Federal
News Service, May 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Transcripts file. Speaking
about the Helms-Burton Act, British Foreign Secretary Rifkind commented, "We do not
quarrel with Congress' aims. But we disagree very strongly with the means they envisage.
Secondary boycotts are wrong in principle." Id.
103. See id.; see also US, EU at Friendly Odds over Helms-Burton, WASH. TRADE
DAILY, Sept. 20, 1996, at 2. A European diplomat indicated that the European Union "is
growing more discontented with the Castro regime, but was adamant that slapping on
sanctions is not the correct course to pursue." Id.; see also Andrew Hill, EU to Delay Retaliating on American Anti-Cuba Laws, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 9, 1996, at B2 ("'We repeat
our absolute opposition to legislation with extra-territorial effects and our determination
to protect the European Union"' (quoting Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring)).
104. See EU Draft Regulation on Helms-Burton, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Aug. 2, 1996, at 23 see also European Union: Demarches Protesting the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, Mar. 5, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 397. The EU "has
consistently expressed its opposition, as a matter of law and policy, to extraterritorial
applications of U.S. jurisdiction which would also restrict EU trade in goods and services
with Cuba...." Id. at 398.
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stated the EU's position in no uncertain terms: "We do not believe it is justifiable or effective for one country to impose its tactics on others and to threaten to aid its friends by targeting its ad10 5
versaries.
The Helms-Burton Act so offended the Europeans that EU
ministers assembled quickly after the Act's signing to express their
opposition to it. 1° 6 The EU ministers expressed their displeasure
not only with the extraterritorial provisions of the Act, but also
with the effects that such unilateral measures would have on the
international trade system, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO). 107 Individually, the constituent nations of the EU
expressed various levels of opposition to the Helms-Burton Actfrom disappointment1 08 to outright condemnation. 109 As an entity,
however, the EU's message is clear: it in no way intends to comply
with the Act.1 10
The EU's assault on the Helms-Burton Act is two-pronged.
One approach is to file charges with the WTO and to rely on the
WTO's settlement mechanisms.1 1 ' At the same time, however, the
EU is also taking unilateral measures. On October 29, 1996, the
EU unanimously approved retaliatory legislation that would allow
Europeans to bring suit to recover damages assessed in U.S. courts
pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act." 12
The three major effects of the EU legislation can be described

105. President Clinton Joint News Conference with Italiaf Prime Minister Romano
Prodi and European Commission President Jacques Santer, in Federal News Service, June
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File.
106. See Janet McEvoy, EU to Urge Firms: Ignore U.S. Helms Burton Law, REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., July 29, 1996, at 1.
107. See id.

108. Spain lodged a diplomatic complaint expressing "disagreement" with the HelmsBurton Act. See Spain Lodges Diplomatic Complaint with Washington, REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., July 2, 1996, at 2.

109. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 103.
110. The EU unanimously adopted blocking legislation to counter the Helms-Burton
Act. See EU to Allow Countqrsuits to Foil U.S. Anti-Cuba Law, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
1996, at Al.
111. See Charles Bremner, Europe Challenges Anti-Cuba Laws at World Trade Body,
TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6523351; see also Julie Wolf, EU
Plans to Ask WTO to Rule on U.S. Law, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,1996, at 2.
112. See Stephanie Griffith, U.S. Draws Fire over Cuba Trade Curbs: European Union
Officials Agree to Retaliate over Helms-Burton Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1996, at C2.
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as non-recognition, noncompliance, and countersuit. First, the EU
legislation states that no member state shall recognize any foreign
judgment that violates international law, namely a judgment that
results from an extraterritorial law. 113 Second, the law forbids any
person from complying with extraterritorial laws either actively or
by deliberate omission.1 14 Third, the legislation entitles any person
against whom a foreign country enters a judgment to seek recovery
of that sum from the original plaintiff in the courts of the Euro115
pean Community.
The EU legislation has the potential of putting European
companies presently doing business in Cuba in a difficult position. 116 On the one hand, continuing to "traffic" in confiscated
property places European companies at risk of triggering lawsuits
and expulsions inder the Helms-Burton Act. On the other hand,
obeying or complying with any of the Helms-Burton Act's provisions puts these companies at risk of suffering EU fines.
At some stage, each company will have to weigh the consequences of each action and choose which course imposes the
lighter penalty: doing or not doing business in Cuba. Further, depending on how vigorously the EU intends to enforce its countermeasures, there seems to be a wide array of interpretations as to
what constitutes "compliance." Carried to an extreme, compliance
may include a decision not to invest in Cuba where there was a developed or announced plan to do so, regardless of whether the
company bases its decision on its own, independent factors or on a
calculus that weighs the potential punishment under the HelmsBurton Act.
While the potential consequences of the EU measure might
lead to the belief that the EU is merely fighting fire with fire-to
113. See EU Draft Regulation on Helms-Burton, supra note 104, art. 4, reprinted in
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 2, 1996, at 23, 24.
1-14. See id. at art. 5. reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 2, 1996, at 23, 24.

115. See id. at art. 6. reprintedin INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 2, 1996, at 23, 24.
116. Spain's biggest investor in Cuba, Sol Melia hotel group, has said that it would
cancel plans to build hotels in Orlando and Miami in favor of continuing operations in
Cuba, but such a move does not necessarily immunize it from the reach of the HelmsBurton Act.

See Canadian Company Penalized Under Helms-Burton, CARIBBEAN

UPDATE, Aug. 1, 1996, at 1. Italian telecommunications company Societa Finanziaria
Telefonica per Azioni (STET) is also subject to the Helms-Burton Act because it uses
properties that formerly belonged to U.S. company IlT Corp. See id.
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the detriment of the international free trade system that it hopes to
preserve-the alternative could prove worse. If the Europeans
obey the Helms-Burton Act, a dangerous precedent could be set.
The United States might be encouraged to use further extensions
of U.S. law to influence foreign policy in other areas of the world.
Indeed, the United States has already shown such willingness with
President Clinton's recent signing of legislation to punish foreign
117
companies that invest in the Iranian and Libyan oil sectors.
The Europeans would be committing utter folly if they neglected to oppose the Helms-Burton Act. Unless Congress ceases
to enact the type of extraterritorial legislation that it has recently
passed, the EU would find a great deal more of its foreign and
trade policies being written in Washington rather than in Europe.
2. Canada
Canada, like the EU, has taken a two-pronged approach to
fighting the Helms-Burton Act. The first is to join the EU in its
fight to convene a settlement panel under the auspices of the
WTO. 118 The second, like the EU, is to act unilaterally to protect
its interests. The Canadian House of Commons passed blocking
legislation, which Prime Minister Jean Chr6tien's government
sponsored, that seeks to bar enforcement in Canada of judgments
rendered in U.S. courts based on the Helms-Burton Act.1 19
The Canadians have been among the most vehement of the
Helms-Burton Act's detractors.1 20 After several condemnations of
U.S. policy, the Canadian government introduced legislation to

117. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541;
See also Toby Roth, New Iranian-Libyan Sanctions Will Only Hurt U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 1996, at A14.
118. See Canada to Join EU in Challenging U.S. Anti-Cuba Law, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct.

3, 1996, at A3.
119. See Bill C-54, An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 35th
Parl. (1996) (Can.). The original Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA) appears
at R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (Can.).
120. See Government of Canada, News Release, Government Introduces Legislation to
Counter U.S. Helms-Burton Act, News Release of the (Sept. 16, 1996). Canada's International Trade Minister, Art Eggleston, remarked: "Helms-Burton is an unwarranted move
to extend the arm of U.S. law into trade between countries. The FEMA changes are a
deterrent against U.S. companies seeking to penalize Canadian firms doing legitimate
business in Cuba." Id.
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12 1
amend the 1984 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA)
12 2
to include retaliatory provisions against the Helms-Burton Act.
Similar to the EU legislation, the FEMA amendments authorize
the Canadian government to issue "blocking" orders to prevent
the enforcement in Canada of judgments based on foreign laws
deemed objectionable-in this case, extraterritorial. 123 Unlike the
EU legislation, however, the FEMA amendments explicitly target
the Helms-Burton Act. 124 In addition, the legislation includes a
"clawback" provision to provide a Canadian forum for Canadian
companies to recover damages paid pursuant to Title III suits from
the original plaintiff. 125 The Canadian law also provides for an
award of court costs for the suits in both countries. 126 The Canadian judgment applies against the U.S. plaintiff's assets in Can127
ada.
The FEMA amendments also seek to deter Canadians from
complying with the Helms-Burton Act by increasing the penalties
for compliance from C$10,000 under the original FEMA to C$1.5
million under the amended FEMA. 128 By comparison, the penal129
ties under the U;S. law can only reach U.S. $1 million.

The FEMA amendments have a great potential for putting
Canadian companies in a precarious position. Undoubtedly, like
European firms, Canadian companies will have to weigh a decision
to conduct business in Cuba against the legal and economic consequences that such a decision might produce. One Canadian company already chose to ignore the deterrent intent of the HelmsBurton Act even before the passage of the FEMA amendments.
Sherritt International Corporation, (Sherritt) a Canadian nickel
mining company with $200 million invested in CUba, sent a clear
121. For6ign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (Can.).
122. See Bill C-54, An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 35th
Par!. (1996) (Can.).
123. See id. § 4.
124. See id. § 7. The law expressly indicates: "Any judgment given under the law of
the United States entitled Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of
1996 shall not be recognized or enforceable in any manner in Canada." Id.
125. See id. § 9.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. § 7.
129. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R pt. 515 (1994).
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signal that it intends to ignore the Helms-Burton Act. 130 Although
it previously held meetings in Toronto and London, it recently
131
convened a meeting of its board of directors in Havana, Cuba.
While the Helms-Burton Act does not per se bar doing business in
Cuba, Sherritt seized the opportunity to send a message that it
clearly intends to continue its relationship with Cuba and to use
property expropriated by the Cuban government.
Sherritt's executives have already been targets of the HelmsBurton Act's exclusionary policy. In July 1996, the U.S. State Department sent a letter to Sherritt's top executives indicating that
Sherritt was violating the Act and, therefore, the executives and
their families were barred from the United States. 132 The real test
of the Helms-Burton Act, however, namely liability under the Title III lawsuit provision, has yet to materialize because President
Clinton recently suspended that provision until June of 1997.133
3. Mexico
Like the EU and Canada, Mexico has also chosen both unilateral and multilateral measures to counter the Helms-Burton Act.
It has chosen to join Canada in an effort to convene a NAFTA
dispute resolution panel, charging that the Helms-Burton Act violates NAFTA. 134 In addition, Mexico has taken its own initiative;
on October 23, 1996, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo signed
the Law for the Protection of Trade and Investment from Foreign
Regulations Which Infringe Upon International Law. 135 The
Mexican law, which is less strident than either the EU or Canadian
130. See Pascal Fletcher, SherrittRisks U.S. Ire with Cuba Meeting, FIN. POST, Sept. 12,

1996, at 1. Sherritt is currently using properties that were once owned by Louisiana-based
Freeport-MacMoran Co., which has a multi-million dollar outstanding claim. See id.; see
also Canadian Companies Take Steps to Minimize Impact of Helms-Burton, N. AM. FREE
TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., July 31, 1996, at 1.
131. See Fletcher supra note 130.

132. See CanadianCompany Penalized Under Helms-Burton, supra note 116.
133. See Rossella Brevetti & Peter Menyasz, Clinton Delays Lawsuits Under Title III
of Helms-Burton, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1158 (July 17, 1996); see also Clinton Extends

Suspension of Right to Sue Under Helms-Burton, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-12
(Jan. 6,
134.
TRADE
135.

1997).
See Canada and Mexico Vow to Fight Anti-Cuba Trade Law, N. AM. FREE
& INVESTMENT REP., June 30, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 10175521.
See Mexico Law Counters U.S. Pressure on Cuba, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 24,

1996, at 3.
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measures, encourages Mexican individuals or companies that may
be affected by "extraterritorial effects of foreign laws" to inform
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade
and Industrial Development. 136 The law also prohibits Mexican
individuals or companies from providing information to foreign
courts or other authorities acting to enforce such extraterritorial
laws.' 37 Further, the law directs Mexican courts to refuse to recognize U.S. decisions or judgments rendered pursuant to the
Helms-Burton Act and has a countersuit provision. 138 Violation of
the Mexican law can result in fines ranging from $3,000 to
$300,000.139
The first major Mexican company caught in the crossfire between the U.S. and Mexican legislation was Grupo Domos, a
Mexican telecommunications company that had invested $706
million in Cuba. 140 The U.S. State Department sent letters to
Grupo Domos executives indicating that Grupo Domos was in
violation of the Helms-Burton Act because it was "trafficking" in
U.S. property, and thus, that the executives and their families were
barred from entering the United States)141
B. Charges of InternationalTrade Agreement Violations
In addition to their unilateral efforts, the EU, Canada, and
Mexico have complained that the Helms-Burton Act violates the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which created the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
1. NAFTA
The NAFTA accords, which were signed into law in 1994,
136. See Law for the Protection of Trade and Investment for Foreign Regulations
Which Infringe upon International Law art. 3, OFFICIAL GAZETTE MEX., Oct. 23, 1996,
at 9.
137. See id., art 2, at 9.
138. See id. arts. 4-5, at 9.
139. See id. art. 9, it 10. Article 9 specifically provides that article 2 violations may
result in "a fine of up to 50,000 days of minimum daily general salary, in effect in the Federal District." Id.; see also Mexico Law Counters U.S. Pressure on Cuba, supra note 135.
140. See Jose de Cordoba, Mexico's Domos Catches U.S.-Cuba Heat, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 1996, at A9.
141. See id.
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promote the principles of free trade among the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. Canada and Mexico contend that the
Helms-Burton Act violates NAFTA in both practice and principle.142
Specifically, section 6091 of the Helms-Burton Act, which
provides for the exclusion of persons found to be trafficking in
U.S. property, appears to violate chapter 1603 of NAFTA, which
grants U.S. entry to foreign businessmen who are otherwise qualified. 143 The exclusion of Canadian and Mexican businessmen
solely on the basis of their investment in Cuba has angered both
countries' governments to the point that the two have requested a
dispute settlement panel under NAFTA to resolve their disagree144
ments with the U.S. law.
On a more general level, however, the Helms-Burton Act appears to interfere with the principles of free trade embodied in
NAFTA. Both Canada and Mexico complain that the HelmsBurton Act effectively interferes with the very trade liberalization
measures that NAFTA was designed to promote. 145 The Clinton
administration, as might be expected, argues that the HelmsBurton Act is "fully consistent" with U.S. international obligations. 146
In August 1996, the Clinton administration hinted, however,
that if pressed on the issue, it would defend the Helms-Burton Act

142. See U.S. Trading Partners Anticipate Implementation of Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, U.S.- CUBA POLICY REP., May 31, 1996, at

1.
143. See id.
144. See Canada and Mexico Vow to Fight Anti-Cuba Trade Law, supra note 134; see
also United States Trade: State Department Issues Visa Denial Guidelines Under HelmsBurton Measure, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., June 30, 1996, available in
1996 WL 10175518; Mexico Continues to Fight Helms-Burton Law, N. AM. FREE TRADE
& INVESTMENT REP., July 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10175535. For a discussion of
Mexican opposition particularly, see Mexico Protests U.S. Barring Domos Chiefs Under

Cuba Law, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 22, 1996, at D2.
145. For a specific discussion of Canada's complaints, see Peter Menyasz, Canada
Plans Legislation to Counter Helms-Burton Law, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1008 (June 19,

1996).
146. NAFTA Round-Up:

Helms-Burton May Be Defended on National Security

Grounds, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., Aug. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL

1017589.
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under NAFTA's "national security" exemption. 147 Recently, the
Clinton Administration has publicly indicated that it might formally invoke the exemption. 148 Chapter 2102 of NAFTA governs
the extent to which a government may take action that would otherwise be inconsistent with NAFTA in order to protect its
"essential national security interests. ' 149 Like international law itself, interpretations of "national security" imperatives are highly
subjective and rely almost exclusively on the good faith and good
judgment of the nations that invoke them. In terms of NAFTA,
the formal invocation of national security to defend the HelmsBurton Act could set a precedent that would encourage other
countries to defend their trade barriers as "vital to national security.' 5 0 While a slippery slope scenario need not be drawn,
stretching the national security exemption to allow the effectuation of one nation's foreign policy-without a clear national security threat-could eviscerate the very principles of free trade that
NAFTA was drafted to uphold.
2. GATT/WTO
While Canada and Mexico have pursued settlement procedures under NAFTA, they have also joined the EU in pressing for
the formation of an investigative panel under the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB).151 On November 20, 1996, after an earlier rejection of such an action, the United States accepted the
formation of a panel that would investigate the effects of the
Helms-Burton Act. 152 Later, on February 20, 1997, after the panel
was appointed, the United States said that the newly-created panel
lacked competence to proceed because the issue did not concern a
trade dispute, but rather a U.S. national security matter. 153 The
consequences of such an investigation could be wide-ranging in147. See id.
148. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Rejects Role for World Court in Trade Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.

149. NAFTA, supra note 14, ch. 2102 (emphasis added).
150. NAFTA Round-Up: Helms-Burton May Be Defended on National Security
Grounds, supra note 146.
151. See WTO Investigation of Helms-Burton on Track: U.S. Accepts Panel Formation,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) A-3 (Nov. 21,1996).
152. See id.

153. See Sanger, supra note 148.
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deed for both the United States and the international trade system.
First, if the WTO panel finds that the Helms-Burton Act violates the WTO, the United States would find itself in a difficult
position. It could be forced either to repeal the portions of the Act
that conflict with the WTO or maintain the Act and defend it as
consistent with its international obligations.
The United States, however, has chosen a third option: recasting the dispute as a matter of U.S. national security instead of
a trade issue.1 54 If the United States eventually chooses to formally invoke "national security" to defend the Helms-Burton Act,
the consequences for the future of the WTO could be dire. Invoking a national security exemption to defend a policy with such
tenuous national security implications might cast into doubt the
U.S. commitment to international free trade or encourage others
to do the same and risk the unraveling of the agreement.
Such a consequence would not only bode ill for the fledgling
trade organization-which is the product of almost fifty years of
GATT negotiations155-but also could have wide-ranging consequences for the United States and its ability to maintain international support for multilateral agreements in others fields. Nuclear
non-proliferation, combating international terrorism, and international peacekeeping efforts are but a few such ventures in which
U.S. leadership is vital to success.
U.S. repudiation of a WTO settlement panel decision would
also affect U.S. domestic policy. To allow a lack of commitment
by the United States to decimate the WTO-after such a long
struggle for the WTO by the United States in general and the Clinton administration in particular-would work at cross-purposes
with the Clinton administration's other stated goals. First, Clinton
fought hard for both the WTO and NAFTA and has been tough
on opening up the Japanese, Chinese, and other markets to U.S.
goods. 156 In addition, he has indicated that he wants to enlarge
NAFTA to include at least Chile and to expand free trade along

154. See id.

155. For a review of these negotiations, see A Brief History of GA TT (visited Nov. 19,
1996) <http://www.unicc.oig/wto/2-2_0_wpf.html#Uruguay>.
156. See Hilary Stout & Carla Anne Robbins, Clinton Is Seeking a Free-Trade Legacy,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at 8.
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the Pacific Rim. 157
Maintaining the Helms-Burton Act threatens another prong
in the U.S. tiade policy, namely the stated goal of strengthening
international financial institutions (IFIs). In a speech to the Bretton Woods Committee, U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin
identified IFIs as "absolutely vital [to] promoting growth and reform in the developing world. '1 58 The Act's call for the diminution of funds to IFIs that assist Cuba risks the U.S. commitment to
multilateral institutions and ultimately risks the institutions themselves, particularly those that rely on U.S. leadership and financial
support.
V. EXTRATERRITORIAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton Act has included vociferous protest from U.S. and international business interests decrying the Act as extraterritorial, 159 a danger to the international legal order, 160 and tantamount to a secondary
boycott 16 1-a
practice that the United States itself has de1
62
nounced.
The Mobil Oil Corporation took out a full-page advertisement in The Economist to urge the U.S. government to rethink its use of what Mobil called a secondary boycott to "tighten
[the U.S.] economic grip. ' 163 In addition, the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, a coalition of U.S. and European business leaders,
recently convened in Chicago and urged the repeal of the extraterritorial provisions of recent U.S. sanctions legislation, including
157. See id.
158.

Rubin Calls for Strengthening InternationalFinancial Institutions, WHITE HOUSE

BULL., Nov. 15, 1996, at 5.

159. See EC Official Welcomes Business Declaration on ExtraterritorialLaws, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-19 (Nov. 15, 1996).
160. See Secondary Boycotts: Squeeze Plays That Hurt Everyone, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2,

1996, at 24, 24.
161. See id. A secondary boycott is a tactic whereby country A says that if X, a national of country C, trades with country B, X may not trade with country A. See Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 429. Essentially, X is given the choice of trading with country A,
the boycotting country, or with country B, the target country, although under the law of
country C, where X is established, trade with both countries A and C is permitted. See id.
162. See Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 430. The United States denounced the Arab
boycott of Israel. See id.
163.

Secondary Boycotts: Squeeze Plays That Hurt Everyone, supra note.160.
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the Helms-Burton Act.164 Furthermore, the National Foreign
Trade Council, a U.S. organization representing 500 of the largest
U.S. multinational corporations, met in September 1996 to discuss
the best approach to reversing or diluting the recent spate of uni165
lateral sanctions legislation.
Many in the U.S. business community feel unfairly excluded
from the Cuban market while European and other countries' companies take advantage of the U.S. exclusion from Cuba. 166 As a
general matter, U.S. businesses dislike unilateral sanctions measures because such measures put U.S. businesses at a disadvantage
vis-A-vis foreign companies. 167 U.S. and international businesses
seem to be wary of the embargo against Cuba, indeed of unilateral
sanctions legislation in general, for two additional reasons: (1) In
an integrated global economy, unilateral sanctions measures have
proven ineffective; and (2) They work to destabilize the global
trade system, particularly when combined with extraterritorial
means.
A recent study of sanctions legislation over several decades
found that such measures are ineffective unless there is a broad
base of support for the sanctions. 168 Indeed, sanctions were most
effective when they were multilateral, such as the international effort against apartheid in South Africa. 169 If such a finding is true,
most free-trade supporters may not be simply motivated by greed
in opposing unilateral sanctions, but may be concerned with exclusion from a market to further a strategy that has questionable
merit. 170
164. See EC Official Welcomes Business Declaration on ExtraterritorialLaws, supra

note 159.
165. See Louis Uchitelle, Who's Punishing Whom?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at C1.
166. See Stanley Meisler, International Business Desire to Reopen Cuba to American
Investment Goes Unfulfilled, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at D4. Dwayne Andreas, chief

executive officer of Archer-Daniels-Midland, an agribusiness conglomerate, remarked,
"'1 think it's just ridiculous that everyone in the world is free to do business in Cuba except us here in America."' Id.
167. See Uchitelle, supra note 165.
168. See id. (citing, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L ECON.,
CONSIDERED (1990)).

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

RE-

169. See id.
170. Many business entities, including multinational corporations, non-governmental
organizations, and trade associations, argue that the infusion of market capitalism
achieves better results than unilateral sanctions. See Lucio A. Noto, Where We Are
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The systemic effects that unilateral sanctions-and particularly sanctions that employ extraterritorial means-have on international trade, cause concern among many in the international
business arena. 171 The National Association of Manufacturers, for
example, has expressed concern that the Helms-Burton Act and
the Iran-Libya Oil Sanctions Act may endanger future U.S. sales
to countries that currently do business with either Cuba, Iran, or
Libya. 172 Although these Acts may have a negative effect on U.S.
exports, and in turn the U.S. economy, there is a much broader
concern. Donald Fites, chairman of Caterpillar, Inc., a heavy machinery company, finds that "'the real pressure is on the U.S. companies that not only must cede American jobs to foreign firms, but
also risk being branded in other markets as unreliable suppliers.'"

17 3

The United States has great influence in the world and is illserved by being hypocritical with respect to international law.
Precisely because the United States often does not benefit from
unilateral sanctions and other forms of "force," it is in the U.S. interest to adhere to international legal principles that foreign countries can respect and follow without feeling prey to U.S. hegemony. In addition, it is a risky venture to jeopardize the disruption
of long-established international legal principles and business customs in the furtherance of a policy that has proven its worthlessness.
VI. ALTERNATIVES
At the heart of the Helms-Burton Act controversy is the underlying debate as to whether to increase pressure on the Castro
regime or to flood Cuba with market capitalism to provoke the
types of changes that marked the transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe. There is over thirty-five years of evidence to support
the contention that increasing pressure not only is ineffective, but
Heading: Remarks at the Offshore Northern Seas Conference (Aug. 27, 1996); see also
Franklin L. Lavin, Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma, FOREIGN POL'Y.,
Fall 1996, at 139. See generally BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS (1988).
171. See Secondary Boycotts: Squeeze Plays That Hurt Everyone, supra note 160; see

also Uchitelle, supra note 165.
172. See Uchitelle, supra note 165.
173. Id.
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also damages U.S. relationships with other nations and puts U.S.
businesses at a disadvantage with regard to Cuba. Therefore, the
best alternative is to repeal the Helms-Burton Act altogether and
formulate a Cuba policy around U.S. principles that reflect sound
international legal concepts. The re-election of Jesse Helms, who
retains the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ensures that such a repeal is unlikely. Nevertheless, if Congress
wishes to maintain its policy, it would be wise to make adjustments
to the existing law.
Congress might reformulate what constitutes the transition to
a democratically elected government in Cuba. To replace the current litany of specific requirements with more general principles
would both respect Cuba's sovereignty and would indicate to U.S.
allies that the United States would accept a democratization process in Cuba that is not entirely an American one. This change
might garner support from other Latin American nations because
the United States would appear less prone to asserting its great
power prerogatives in the Caribbean basin and more willing to
work on a constructive solution to democratize Cuba-the only
non-democratic nation in the Western Hemisphere.
Wisconsin Congressman Toby Roth advanced a series of
amendments that would make the Act more flexible. Before final
passage of the Act, Roth proposed amendments that would offer a
series of aid commitments tied to the determination of a transition
government. 174 These commitments included: (1) negotiation of
either the return of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay to
Cuba or renegotiation of the present agreement; (2) development
assistance; (3) financial guarantees under the Export-Import Bank
of the United States and support under the Overseas Private Investment Corporation for investments in Cuba; (4) relief of Cuba's
external debt; (5) military adjustment assistance; (6) renegotiation
of Most Favored Nation trade status; and (7) negotiation of Cuba's
inclusion in NAFTA. 175 Such initiatives would provide Cubaand Castro-with real incentives for change, instead of leaving
Cuba with a full ballot box and an empty bread box. Indeed,
democratic reforms are hardly enticing without concurrent reforms

174. See The Three Roth Amendments, U.S.-CUBA POL'Y., July 19, 1995, at 2, 2.
175. See id.
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to improve Cuba's ailing economy.
In addition, Congress would have to change the HelmsBurton Act to respect current U.S. obligations under NAFTA.
Specifically, the United States would have to repeal the exclusion
of persons under Title IV. The continued exclusion of foreign
businessmen undermines the U.S. commitment to increased hemispheric free trade, which the United States has worked so laboriously to promote.
The most difficult change concerns the Title III provision conferring a right of action on persons who were not U.S. nationals at
the time of their property loss. Because the provision offends most
principles of jurisdiction and effectively acts as a secondary boycott, its efficacy, either as an international legal principle or a U.S.
foreign policy, cannot be sustained. Admittedly, the changes required to make the Helms-Burton Act conform with international
legal principles would effectively emasculate the law. At the very
least, however, the potential claimants should be limited to persons or companies who were U.S. nationals at the time of their
property confiscation. In this way, the United States would only
be protecting the rights of its own nationals, ingtead of becoming a
forum for foreign claimants.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Helms-Burton Act is bad law. Although it purports to
advance liberty and democracy in the Western Hemisphere, it is
little more than a foreign policy adorned with the legal equivalent
to the emperor's clothing. This type of policy is unwise because in
the international arena, like the political arena in general, what
may be defensible on technical legal grounds does not always
translate into good policy. Worse, vehemently defending as legal
under international law a policy that is facially incongruous with
established international legal principles exposes the type of hypocrisy that can easily undermine the confidence in the international legal order upon which many countries and business interests rely.
Indeed, it is a dangerous precedent for the United States to
codify a U.S. foreign policy and insist that it be followed by thirdparty countries that are not the target of the policy and whose own
policies diverge from the U.S. policy, especially when the implica-
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tions for those third-party countries are so dire. Such a policy can
only breed resentment toward the United States-not only with
regard to the policy in question, but also in other areas of policy.
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